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This Special Section arose out of the 2014 Film-Philosophy conference,
held at the University of Glasgow, which took as its theme: A World of
Cinemas. The aim of both the conference theme and this resulting Special
Section is to broaden the debate in film-philosophy, both in terms of a
world of cinemas and a world of philosophies. This introduction considers
the reasons why such an intervention is worthwhile.
Inter-disciplinary Pulls
Within the discipline of Film Studies, since the mid-1990s film-
philosophy scholarship has come to take the place once held by film
theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The exact meaning of this hyphenated
term typically depends on who you speak to about it, but one popular and
broad definition would be the consideration of how films philosophise (or
‘do philosophy’). A clear example of which might be Gilles Deleuze’s
Bergsonian exploration of how films can be said to demonstrate different
understandings of space (albeit through movement) or time. But there are
numerous others areas that might be considered. With the discipline of
Film Studies’ famous turn to history in the 1980s bringing the historical to
the forefront of research in the field, things theoretical – whilst never
really going away – may not now always be addressed directly as such. For
instance, it would not be uncommon for historically engaged work on a
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national cinema and culture to explore, for instance, gender roles, using
many of the analytical tools first developed during the previous era of
so-called High or Grand Theory.
In such a context, then, theoretical issues are more likely to be directly
explored as such in the arena opened up by the emergence of
film-philosophy. Even so, the importance of film-philosophy, in such a
historically-led discipline, may not always be readily acknowledged by all.
This is a little surprising, as globally there is plenty of evidence that such
an approach is of great interest. As the statistics produced by the website
deleuzecinema.com illustrate, on just this one topic – the intersection of
Deleuze’s ideas and cinema – there is sufficient interest to produce 16,000
visits from 10,000 users in over 100 countries worldwide (with 60% of
these visits taking place beyond the UK and the USA), within just three
years of its existence. More broadly, the website for Film-Philosophy
(film-philosophy.com) has received around 5000 visits per month for at
least the preceding five years. With film-philosophy research already
expanding far beyond the initially pivotal importance of Deleuze to now
encompass any number of other philosophical figures, what makes
film-philosophy more than just film theory reloaded is its interdisciplinary
scope. Film-philosophy, as the name rather obviously suggests, has the
potential for different ways of working. The most obvious division being,
on the one hand, the exploring of films as philosophy (film-philosophy),
versus, on the other hand, more cognitivist and analytical approaches to
film (philosophy of film) (Sinnerbrink 2011, pp. 3–5). More importantly,
the interdisciplinary field now has a lengthy historical canon and
broader global reach with which to engage. This provides significantly
more scope than film theory’s initial focus on mainly nineteenth and
twentieth century European thinkers such as Karl Marx and Sigmund
Freud (although such figures remain crucial to the development of
film-philosophy).
That said, there remains a need to broaden our intellectual horizons.
In the UK, where film-philosophy finds one of the, if not the, greatest
concentration of scholars globally, the study of philosophy in the academy
remains focused on the Anglo-American Analytic and the (so-called)
‘Continental ’ European traditions, very much in that order. The world of
philosophies that exist and which have existed beyond this Eurocentric
realm, are more likely to be studied by scholars working in or engaging
with a specific geographical part of the world, or by those engaged in
debates surrounding otherness, as opposed to by scholars of philosophy
per se. Or at least, certainly this is the case in the West. For instance, the
works of Latin American philosophers like Enrique Dussel, Anı´bal
Quijano or Walter Mignolo (which are part of a tradition influenced by,
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amongst other areas, indigenous thought) are likely to be fairly well
known both to scholars in numerous disciplines in Latin American, as well
as those working globally in Latin America studies, or to those examining,
for instance, the global discourses surrounding a topic like race (e.g.
Robert Stam and Ella Shohat, Race in Translation (2012)). Yet they will be
far less well known, if at all, to scholars of philosophy, at least in the West.
No doubt other such examples could be given from other parts of the
world, including Abdolkarim Soroush, Kitaro Nishida, Achille Mbembe,
amongst many others.
Indeed, the debate surrounding the relationship between these two
dominant branches of philosophy in the West only further detracts from
the realisation that there is much more going on in the wider world that
we are not discussing in philosophy or, by turns, film-philosophy. As
John Mullarkey summarises early on in Post-Continental Philosophy
(2006), a work which then attempts to move beyond this divide:
Philosophically speaking, of course, there is no such thing as ‘Continental
philosophy ’ at all – this is both a sham geo-cultural distinction and a
category error. There is not one philosophical theme that is exclusive to the
European Continent, nor any outside the Continent that is confined to
‘Anglo-American ’ philosophy. The mention of Continental philosophy
also brings to mind its other ill-coined associate, ‘Analytic philosophy ’; but
no methodological barrier exists between the two traditions either. In fact,
it is extremely difficult to make any distinction stand up under historical,
methodological, or philosophical scrutiny. (p.1)
We might consider the construction of the category of ‘Continental ’
philosophy, then, as rather like Edward W. Said’s famous observations on
how the Orient is constructed from the perspective of the West; that is,
through homogenisation and a form of misrepresentation that works by
projecting a reverse image of one’s own (self-chosen, self-defining)
positive attributes onto the other. Curiously, in this instance the
Anglophone projection of otherness onto ‘Continental ’ philosophy
renders philosophy very much a Western affair, and everything beyond
it, presumably, something of a philosophical wilderness. Thus, as
Mullarkey helpfully concludes: ‘ the Analytic–Continental distinction is
philosophically erroneous but metaphilosophically accurate: it has less to
do with what philosophers think about when they philosophise than
where they philosophise, with whom they talk about it, and what they say
about it to each other ’ (2006, p.2). This begs the question, then, of how to
decentre this confining binary, how to broaden the horizon of where we
philosophise, with whom, and in what way, by engaging with a world of
philosophies via a world of cinemas.
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Other scholars make a similar point in ways that can be illuminating
for this discussion. In Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (1999),
Robert B. Pippin considers how European philosophy can be understood
as expressive of dissatisfaction with ‘the affirmative normative claims
essential to European modernization ’ (p. xi). As part of this broader
debate, Pippin explores what might be considered to make European
philosophy European. For Pippin, put ‘crudely ’ (as he has it), a broad
distinction can be drawn between, on the one hand a Western European
tradition which takes as a philosophical focus a largely negative reaction
against modern bourgeois culture, together with its underpinning
Enlightenment ideals of science, individual rights, civil society and
democracy. This is the tradition often labelled ‘Continental ’ philosophy,
and Pippin makes a compelling case for what connects many thinkers
in this tradition, for instance with regard to the nihilism which emerges
due to problems arising from modernity (1999, pp. 78–113). On the
other hand there is an Anglo-American tradition which, comparatively,
does not consider the topic of modernity to be a philosophical problem
(whether the reaction to it is negative or not) (Pippin 1999, p. xix).
In The Idea of Continental Philosophy (2006), Simon Glendinning
picks up on this aspect of Pippin’s argument in his conclusion, to
critique Pippin’s position on philosophy and modernity. Glendinning’s
critique affirms something of Pippin’s initial, ‘crude’ formulation of
this idea, before adding his own alternative conclusion. Glendinning
states:
Isn’t there something to the idea of an important division within Western
culture between those who do and those who do not experience modernity
as a problem? I believe there is. However, the distinction is not, I would
suggest, one between analytic and so-called Continental philosophers.
Rather it is a distinction between those who attempt to come reflectively to
terms with our supposedly modern condition and those who accept it
without much ado. It is, I want to say, not a division within philosophy but a
distinction between a philosophical and non-philosophical relation to
modernity. (2006, p. 109)
Yet, why should this reflexivity be solely situated within Western culture,
in line with the Eurocentric myth of ‘self-critical reflexivity as a Western
monopoly ’ (Stam and Shohat 2012, p. 67)? What is true of many Western
philosophers with regard to their reflexive concern with modernity (and
in Glendinning’s distinction this includes writers in both Analytic and
Continental traditions), is equally true, if not more so, of a great many
philosophers from other parts of the world. This is in particular so in
the numerous areas where European modernity arrived as a colonising
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force over many centuries. For example, Latin American philosophy’s
discussion of the nexus of coloniality/modernity (as found in the works of,
precisely, Dussel, Quijano, Mignolo et al), understands the historical
development of the Eurocentric world system after 1492 as emerging on
the back of widespread genocide and enslavement. There would not have
been any modernity without the unequal structure of power it also
created, coloniality. This history includes the genocidal extinguishing of
indigenous ways of thinking which pre-existed the arrival of Europeans
and European ways of thinking, and it extends all the way through time to
the Holocaust which took place in Europe during the Twentieth Century’s
Second World War. Whilst many European philosophers find this latter
event somehow inexplicable, Caribbean philosopher Charles W. Mills
notes in The Racial Contract (1997) that it is part of the same long history
of genocidal acts perpetrated by European colonisers against non-white
populations, globally, since 1492 (pp. 98–105). With this historical
backdrop in mind, it is perhaps not at all surprising that modernity elicits
a negative reaction within any philosophical tradition, European or
otherwise. After all, its noblest ideas are founded upon a ground that is
quite literally blood soaked and ransacked, the glimpsing of which
undercuts their very veracity.
As Robert Sinnerbrink points out in response to Glendinning, those
philosophers who self-identify as working in a ‘Continental ’ tradition
are unlikely to consider themselves unwitting dupes of an Analytic ruse
which homogenises them as though part of an Orientalist other.
Sinnerbrink observes that whilst Glendinning argues ‘ that there is no
single tradition encompassing the ‘usual suspects ’ [… Glendinning]
underplays the possibility that ‘Continental philosophy’ is a portmanteau
term – institutional as well as intellectual – covering a plurality of
traditions, each with its own practices of philosophical inheritance.
Glendinning thus ‘chickens out ’ (to use his phrase) on radical pluralism,
preferring to explain away the divide rather than reflect upon its reality’
(Sinnerbrink 2008, p. 697). Sinnerbrink’s alternative, pluralist perspective
argues for the existence of various ‘Continental ’ traditions. It positions
philosophy as not one but many. It is as though ‘Continental ’ philosophy,
whilst positioned, as minority cultures often are, in relation to a more
dominant, hegemonic culture, nevertheless engages in various ways with
all the challenges and creative possibilities that such a position entails.
By extension, Sinnerbrink’s argument points to the pluralistic nature of
philosophy more broadly, and the Eurocentrism of debates which rack
focus exclusively on defining the Western tradition as though it were the
central problem for the field. What Sinnerbrink’s position indicates, then,
is the need to consider the greater complexity of traditions of which
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European philosophy is just one global province, that of a world of
philosophy.
The Analytic/Continental debate signals as much as anything the need
to reach out beyond Western philosophers in order to gain perspective
on their provincial concerns. Even some of the more challenging
developments in Western philosophy in the 21st century, such as
speculative realism and object oriented ontology, are primarily focused
on revolutionising this very Western tradition that emerges after
Immanuel Kant (in line with Glendinning’s view regarding
contemporary philosophy’s engagement with Kant, across the straw man
divide of Analytic/Continental traditions), and to which they by turns also
belong (2006, p. 102). Broadly speaking, the writings of those grouped
together under the term speculative realism – if it can be considered a
cohesive movement – unite around the shared challenge to the Kantian
position which shapes so much Western thinking (through the
development of phenomenology, and on to the present): that the only
way for humanity to know the world is through its relationship to it,
rather than in and of itself. As Quentin Meillassoux notes in the
extraordinarily eye-opening After Finitude (2008), after Kant, ‘we only
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never
to either term considered apart from the other ’ (2008, p. 5). Speculative
realism, engaging with the dangers that humanity faces due to climate
change, and a potentially imminent sixth mass extinction event, thus
speculates instead as to how we might understand the world in ways other
than through this Kantian anthropocentrism.
Briefly delving a little further into speculative realism will assist in
furthering this argument about the need to engage with both a world of
cinemas and a world of philosophies, by way of productive comparison.
To put things rather reductively, speculative realists would presumably
argue that the popular philosophical conundrum of, ‘ If a tree falls in the
forest and no one is there to see it, does it make any sound?’, is simply
an anthropocentric one, and revealing only of the unhelpful separation
that Western philosophy maintains between humanity and nature.
Meillassoux, for example, would presumably point out that trees
pre-existed humanity (what he calls the ‘ancestral ’, which he defines as
‘any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species ’) (2008,
p. 10), and indeed, exist when humanity is not around. Accordingly,
we might speculate that a speculative realist position on this conundrum
might be that – (obviously), yes, the millions of trees that fell in the forest
before there were any humans to see them, and indeed, those that do so to
this day when we are not looking, all make a sound (and, perhaps, they are
also all ‘heard’ in their falling (or perhaps we should speculate that this
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might be better understood as, ‘ felt ’ in their falling) by the forest, or at
least, the other objects within it). From such a position, this response
would not naively miss the point of the conundrum, but point to its
very flaw.
Yet, with the coloniality/modernity position of certain Latin American
philosophers in mind, in many parts of the world might this conundrum,
historically, have been considered a rather redundant one for a related
reason? In many places it might have simply been formulated as a
statement more along the lines of: ‘Someone’s cut down all the trees.
It must have been the Europeans in their boats. They seem to think the
world revolves around them. ’ Accordingly, could not even such
unorthodox movements as speculative realism (unorthodox at least in
terms of the Western canon) offer a great deal more to knowledge if they
also engaged more broadly with a world of philosophies?1
Such an argument might start with a text only very recently published
at time of writing, that is useful for thinking beyond a Eurocentric
philosophical canon. Hamid Dabashi’s Can Non-Europeans Think? (2015)
re-engages with some previously, at times, heated debates between
scholars like Dabashi and Mignolo on the one side, and Slavoj Zˇizˇek on
the other, who identify themselves along a non-European/European
divide. Like the speculative realists, Dabashi is highly critical of Kant, but
unlike the speculative realists it is not for his anthropocentrism, but for his
Eurocentrism, or indeed, his racism. Dabashi observes that Kant, along
with many other European philosophers after him, denies ‘others the
capacity to think critically or creatively by way of enabling, authorizing,
and empowering themselves to think for the world’ (2015, p. 259). Only
European philosophers, Dabashi points out, are believed (by European
philosophy) to have this capacity.
Dabashi’s difference in terms of starting point leads to a markedly
different destination to that of the speculative realists. Dabashi’s book
emphasises that beyond the European canon there is a large body of work
developing which attempts to understand the world, philosophically, in an
entirely different way (2015, p.4). In this it follows in the wake of works
by other thinkers who have made similar statements. Noticeably, in his
Foreword, Mignolo (also noting the racism in Kant) reiterates his previous
ideas regarding border thinking. This term refers to the double bind faced
1. Speculative realism has already received constructive critique from within the
parameters of the Western canon, in Steven Shaviro’s The Universe of Things: On
Speculative Realism (2014), which offers an alternative way of proceeding through the
same philosophical territory by engaging with Alfred North Whitehead’s thinking
(Shaviro 2014).
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by those outwith Western philosophy of having to know it in order to
consider an alternative to it (2015, p. xxxiii; a point also made by Dabashi
(2015, p. 5)), in a manner which is not required of European
philosophers. This is particularly so in what Mignolo refers to as our
emerging ‘multipolar global world order ’ (p. xlii). Which approach is the
most reflexive with regard to modernity should by now be clear.
Dabashi further argues that Western philosophy is not well equipped to
understand the newly emerging world of ‘de-Europeanized ’ globalized
capital (2015, pp. 5–12). The former geopolitical structure, of the global
colonial centre and its colonised (Orientalised) periphery – that which
similarly defines Eurocentric ideas of where philosophy does and does not
exist globally – is no longer true of our world (p. 23). Thus Dabashi notes
that although in “its originary modernity this globalized capital was made
mythically ‘European’”, now it is non-European philosophies emerging
from amongst those ‘disenfranchised by the global operation of capital ’
who by virtue of their need to think beyond the European canon are able
to philosophise most accurately about the emerging world (p. 12).
Ultimately, Dabashi here calls for European philosophers to open out
their focus from their own tradition (that which constructed the
imperialist mental cartography of the world as centred around a
knowing European subject exclusively able to think about the knowable
world beyond its bounds, and those in that other realm, who cannot know
themselves – i.e. the West and the Rest), and meet the other philosophers
of the world on a level playing field. Dabashi calls for philosophers to
stand ‘next to ’ each other (2015, p. 28). This position is not a million miles
away from that of Dussel’s ‘ transmodernity ’ (which calls for an encounter
or engagement between modernity and its others), as is discussed in
Martin-Jones’s contribution to this Special Section, including in terms of
how much more it may offer to study of a world of cinemas than an
approach like speculative realism (1995, p.76). For Dabashi, this
proximity will help philosophers to engage with the contemporary
world in a more meaningful manner (2015, p. 23).
It is perhaps not surprising that something very similar of what can be
said of the need to broaden philosophical engagements, to encompass a
wider world of thought, can also be said of film-philosophy. Whilst the
annual Film-Philosophy conferences in recent years have slowly begun to
see papers on how philosophies from ‘elsewhere ’ might assist in our
comprehension of a world of cinemas, as yet these remain very much
sparkling but nonetheless scattered, singular shooting stars in the
firmament. The work going on both ‘elsewhere ’ and ‘here ’ to broaden
our grasp of a world of philosophies in relation to film is only appearing in
glimpses, brought by those scholars willing and/or able to take a step
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towards the rest. This is not to suggest that the Film-Philosophy
conferences are a parochial affair, as the range of countries from which
delegates hail has been wide. Nevertheless, it now seems imperative that
we open outwards much more to seek greater engagement. In this respect,
there is an excellent opportunity for film-philosophy to harness and
decisively utilise the increasing interest in a world of cinemas that emerges
from within the historical turn in Film Studies (the argument can even be
made that the turn to history should be seen, in retrospect, as a turn to a
world of cinemas) (Martin-Jones 2011), and to embrace what the coming
decades will realise of the world of philosophies beyond the Analytic/
Continental traditions, and indeed, the obscuring of their provinciality
generated by Eurocentric debates surrounding the divide in ‘philosophy’
that they supposedly illustrate.
The Film Studies ‘side ’ (of the hyphen) of film-philosophy has arguably
progressed further than its counterpart, Philosophy, in this respect,
precisely through its acknowledgement of the importance of studying a
world of cinemas. Along with a very gradual emergence of English
translations of works by film scholars from locations such as Japan, China
and Argentina amongst others (e.g. Sato 1982, 2008; Dai 2002; Aguilar
2008), indicative of an increasing awareness of ‘other ’ voices writing on
their ‘own’ cinemas, there have also been some studied attempts to engage
directly with traditions beyond the Western canon. In the Global North,
standout texts such as Aaron Gerow’s Visions of Japanese Modernity
(2010), and Victor Fan’s Cinema Approaching Reality (2015), for example,
engage with critical and theoretical works on film, from Japan and China
respectively. Each in their own way enables a greater understanding of
how film was, and is, conceived of in these locations. In so doing, these
books also enable a broadening and reconsideration of debates in film
theory that are ongoing in English language Film Studies in its more
established locations (especially in parts of Europe, North America,
Australia and New Zealand). As Fan argues so compellingly in relation to
the Chinese context, there is much to be gained by engaging with the
different, often as yet obscured or over-shadowed film theories of the
world (in a situation where the dominant ideas which hold sway globally
tend to emanate from the West), by enabling a ‘cross-cultural discourse ’ to
enrich knowledge on both sides (2015, p.3). This is a process in which
Canan Balan engages in this Special Section, for example, by examining
the writings of the early twentieth century Kurdish Islamic thinker Said
Nursıˆ.
These developments in Film Studies help us understand why Dabashi’s
invitation for non-European philosophers to engage in dialogue is not
necessarily always as unconditionally welcoming as it might sound.
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In Can Non-Europeans Think? Dabashi argues that Europeans should learn
to ‘read’ without assimilating new knowledge of the rest of the world back
into the known parameters of Western thought (2015, p. 6). This assertion
against the return of colonizing thinking seems entirely reasonable; asking
Europeans to consider the thoughts of those beyond Europe in their own
right, and as equals (p. 28). Yet, in practice this means that in his
scholarship on cinema Dabashi does not necessarily always welcome
certain attempts by Western scholars to engage with Iranian cinema using
European philosophical ideas (2007, p. 343). This seemingly less
welcoming stance is explained as being, in part, because the ‘ inorganic
nature of cinematic writing on Iranian cinema’ means that it has been, as
yet, insufficiently theorised or understood (2008, p. 116). For Dabashi,
outsiders cannot read (literally) or incorporate knowledge of what
Iranians think about Iranian cinema. Moreover, ‘ the globalized nature of
spectatorship ’ (as Iranian films circulate on the international film festival
circuit, for instance) renders Iranian films, he argues, ‘ fetishized
commodities ’ divorced from their context of production. As a result of
this imbalance, Dabashi considers ‘ the theorists and practitioners of
Iranian cinema’ not to be involved in a ‘hermeneutic circle ’ discussing the
‘hidden and/or operative aesthetics of Iranian cinema’ (2008, p. 240).
To be clear, Dabashi is not arguing for cultural identity and language
usage as the most appropriate ways to underpin the veracity of
interpretation (2008, p. 72). Although he clearly does consider this
kind of knowledge base desirable, as do most scholars of a world of
cinemas, to be fair. Rather, his argument illustrates the precariousness of
meaning that can attach to films from around the world, at the intersection
of what we might call, reductively, ‘ indigenous ’ and ‘ international ’
interpretations. In this respect Dabashi echoes Glauber Rocha’s manifesto
‘An Esthetic of Hunger ’ (1965), which famously critiques the
consumption of Brazilian films internationally as the temporary dining
out on another’s misery on film, as though it were a momentary
consumable exoticism disconnected from its context of production (Rocha
1965). Thus Dabashi similarly argues for an ‘Aesthetics of Emancipation’,
also decrying the festival circuit’s ‘paradoxical matching of Third World
miseries as spectacle with transnational bourgeoisie as spectator ’ (very
often consumed individually on DVD in private homes across the
developed world, rather than to potentially mobilise a public in the
location where the films were made) to journalistically manufacture ‘a
liberal transaesthetics of indifference that corresponds to the logic of the
military globalization it represents ’ (2008, p. 33).
Albeit, Dabashi mitigates this starkly oppositional position towards film
festivals in the following pages of his illuminating Makhmalbaf at
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Large (2008). He acknowledges: the potential that festivals have as sites of
global resistance where ideas can creatively cross-pollenate (p. 34); the
(admittedly very fine) distinction he considers to exist between the kind of
seemingly unknowing global consumption that he critiques as taking
place in the West and what he considers a more nuanced grasp of Iranian
cinema that is possible in other parts of what might be considered the
Global South (p. 119); and indeed, finally, the potential of filmmakers to
create art that challenges indifference, regardless of how their films are
consumed (p. 200). Yet whether or not one is entirely in agreement with
Dabashi on such points, the seeming difference in stance across his works
on philosophy and film – whether welcoming dialogue with regard to
thinking, or attempting to rebalance discussion by being less welcoming
with regard to film criticism – illustrates the particular challenges of
thinking at the border. It demonstrates, I would argue, something of the
perhaps inevitable corresponding sense of a need also to maintain or
protect said borders at times against potentially obscuring or colonising
discourses.
Indeed, what goes for research into a world of cinemas seems equally so
for a world of philosophies. The consequence of this is that, by turns, it
makes the kind of dialogue that is invited by Dabashi by no means an easy
or straightforward practice. It requires a considered approach, and the
awareness of a likely degree of incomplete understanding (albeit along
with the gaining of a new perspective), presumably for all parties. This by
turns is likely to be at times welcome, at times less so, again presumably
for all parties. Yet this can be attempted at least, as the aforementioned
works by Gerow and Fan demonstrate in relation to Japanese and Chinese
cinemas. Or, alternatively, and to remain with Iranian cinema a moment
longer, Farhang Erfani’s Iranian Cinema and Philosophy (2012) perhaps
provides a useful example of an attempt to, as Erfani states, walk the ‘fine
line ’ between film theory and philosophy of film on the one hand, and
Iranian cinema on the other (p. 3).
This difference in levels of engagement with the broader world found in
Film Studies may be in part because this discipline has had to realise the
need to reach out geographically and geopolitically to find the richness of
a history which, stemming from only the late nineteenth century, is simply
a great deal shorter than that which Philosophy (and many other subjects)
can boast. In this respect, recent standout texts like Sae¨r Maty Baˆ and Will
Higbee’s anthology De-Westernising Film Studies (2012) are not only part
of the growing ‘ transnational turn’, but are also the latest instalments in a
lineage of works considering how to understand a world of cinemas. In
this instance, they proceed by challenging the ‘West ’ not as a geographical
and historically bound region, but as an ‘ ideologically inflected mode of
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being in and seeing, perceiving or representing the world’ which informs
discourses in Film Studies (Baˆ and Higbee 2012, p. 2).
This growing corpus includes work on various different cinemas
worldwide, including since the 1980s, in English alone, over twenty
scholarly books on Indian cinema, Chinese cinemas (PRC, Hong Kong,
Taiwan), and cinemas across Africa, along with at least ten each on cinema
in Brazil, Argentina, Iran, South Korea, New Zealand, to name only a
few instances. It also includes canonical texts dating back to works on
the ‘Third Cinema’ manifestos of the 1960s (emerging from Brazil,
Argentina and Cuba) (Rocha [1965], Solanas and Getino [1969], Espinosa
[1969]), and the academic works that followed (e.g. Tesholme H. Gabriel,
Third Cinema in the Third World (1982)), and more recently, ranges from
Ella Shohat and Robert Stam’s Unthinking Eurocentrism (1994) to
Stephanie Dennison and Song Hwee Lim’s edited collection Remapping
World Cinema (2006). These and others have broadly engaged with what it
means to explore a world of cinemas.
What the study of a world of cinemas thus emphasises above all else is,
it seems to me, the need to balance an understanding and engagement
with the context of production (industrial, cultural, historical, critical)
together with an attendance to the broader ‘world ’ in which such films are
made and circulate. A huge part of this process, regarding context in
particular (so widely practised after the turn to history), relates to the
emphasis now placed on understanding the philosophical worldview of
different cultures when analysing cinemas of the world. This is perhaps
most readily evident in the studies of popular Indian cinema which
emphasise its non-Aristotelian narrative structure, due to the origins of its
aesthetic in Sanskrit texts such as the Ramayana and the Mahabharata
(Martin-Jones 2011, p. 207). This knowledge can be balanced with the
situation in the ‘world’ of, in the case of ‘Bollywood’ (and to some extent
this goes for India’s film industries more broadly), a cinema which has a
regional and global reach and an aesthetic that has been influenced by
other cultures and their cinemas. Thus, to understand how film thinks,
how film philosophises, we need more fully to engage with not only a
world of cinemas that is locally embedded and globally intertwined, but
also a similarly complexly-interrelated world of philosophies that inform
such cinematic articulations.
A Small Step
The articles contained in this Special Section were either delivered at the
2014 Film-Philosophy conference or have been developed from original
ideas by the conference organisers. There was a huge range of papers that
could have been included, from amongst panels on Australian, Brazilian,
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Chilean, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and Japanese Cinemas, which is not to
mention the talks on films from various other parts of the world, and just
as importantly, the numerous philosophers and philosophical traditions
under discussion. Ultimately these particular papers were chosen as they
were from amongst the most well developed ideas at that time, and when
collected together within the necessarily limited confines of a Special
Section, they could give the most coherent expression of intent: namely, to
indicate the untapped plurality of thought which film-philosophy has the
capacity to access, which exists at the intersection of a world of cinemas and
philosophies.
This collection, then, is but a small step towards a much bigger project,
a gesture or indication towards the myriad pathways that are yet to be
explored by film-philosophy’s coming engagement with not only a much
broader world of cinemas, but also of philosophies. This bigger project
will require several generations of scholars to be realised, and will need to
negotiate the geopolitical complexities of not only how (to paraphrase
Dabashi) non-European films and philosophies think, but also, who is
willing or able to speak about them, how they speak about them, and so
on: we return to Mullarkey’s ‘where … with whom … and what ’ (2006,
p.2). There is far too much ground there for any one Special Section. Still,
a small step can be taken.
The collection of articles has been designed to do two things, which
intertwine to greater or lesser degrees in the respective contributions, at
the nexus of the study of a world of cinemas and philosophies. Firstly, to
introduce philosophers of the world who are as yet either entirely or
relatively unknown to the study of film. Secondly, to consider new ways of
understanding a world of cinemas philosophically, whether using
established or (relatively) less well-known philosophical positions. The
first aim is more prominent in the first articles, the latter in the later
pieces, as though a transformation were gradually evident between these
poles in the reading experience, with two pieces on ‘non-cinema’
providing the pivotal heart of the collection.
The Special Section starts with Laura U. Marks’s introduction to film-
philosophy of the thought of the Sixteenth/Seventeenth Century Persian
philosopher, Sadr al-Dı¯n Muhammad al-Shı¯ra¯zı¯ (Mulla¯ Sadra¯). Marks
demonstrates how Sadraˆ’s idea of the ‘ imaginal realm’ (as part of a triad of
realms, sensible, imaginal and intelligible) offers an alternative to dualistic
thought, a process ontology comparable with those of Western thinkers
like Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Henri Bergson or
Alfred North Whitehead. When engaged with cinema, this idea from
Eastern Islamic philosophy suggests new ways of understanding how film
can enable us to think about collective politics, and imagine that which
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does not yet exist. Canan Balan’s ensuing article also explores the works of
an Islamic thinker, this time the Nineteenth/Twentieth Century Kurdish
writer Said Nursıˆ. Balan speculates on how Nursıˆ ’s exploration of cinema
as a means to access the divine (‘God’s cinema’), suggests that it was his
exposure to the early silent cinema of attractions specifically, during a life
lived often in prison or in exile after 1925, which led to his conclusions.
As with Marks’s contribution on Sadraˆ (which considers Sadraˆ in relation
to Siegfried Kracauer, Andre´ Bazin and Gilles Deleuze), Balan’s focus on
Nursıˆ offers a way of considering cinema that is alternative to existing
theories already established in the canon, in this instance Hugo
Mu¨nsterberg, Walter Benjamin and Deleuze amongst others. Thus,
although this is not the first time that the works of a philosopher from
Western Asia have been engaged with in contemporary film-philosophy,2
what these two articles offer is an opportunity for readers to reconsider
how film theory might have looked in, as it were, another imagined world,
had the ideas of thinkers like Sadraˆ and Nursıˆ been as central to the
development of the canon as the existing Western names that are so well
known.
Two articles then follow which engage with the work of the
contemporary Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel (who is
Argentine, but who has been based in Mexico since the latest Argentine
dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s). Martin-Jones focuses on Dussel’s
post-Levinasian concept of ‘ transmodernity ’ as a way to consider globally
encompassing issues, such as, in this instance, the importance of the
nonhuman history of the planet, as foregrounded by recent work on
ecology in Film Studies. Dussel’s work, in this instance, provides an
alternative to the emerging focus on speculative realism for exploring
certain films that explore nonhuman and ecological concerns in a
transnational manner. However, more broadly, the point of the piece is to
give at least one example of the usefulness of Dussel for film-philosophy,
namely via his historicized ethics and the opportunity this provides for
discussion of how a world of cinema engages with world history. The
article that follows, by William Brown likewise focuses on Dussel’s
philosophy of liberation, but here emphasising its ‘barbarian ’ aspect (as a
philosophy of the global periphery) which is put into a productive
relationship with the ideas of various other thinkers (for example, Antonio
Negri and Franc¸ois Laruelle), in order to develop the idea of ‘non-cinema’.
Brown explores how the almost unquantifiable global wealth of digital
2. For example, in addition to the examples which Laura U. Marks cites in her
contribution, see also William Brown (2012).
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filmmaking can be considered to contain within it the possibility of a
non-capitalist cinema, foregrounding its labour, one that has been
immanent to cinema since its inception.
At the centre of the Special Section, Brown’s take on ‘non-cinema’ is
joined by another view of the term as formulated by Lu´cia Nagib. Nagib
returns to Bazin in order to examine how cinema embraces ‘ impurity ’,
through interbreeding with the other, ‘uncinematic ’ arts (a practice
nowadays referred to as intermediality), in order to transform thought,
and in so doing, politically transform society. In this endeavour, Nagib
engages not only with Bazin, but also Alain Badiou, Theodor W. Adorno,
and Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard. However, noticeably, Nagib also draws upon
the work of Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who
writes on how indigenous Tupi-Guaranı´ peoples of the Amazon
(specifically the Arawate´ tribe) consider the importance of ritual
cannibalism for understanding how they appear to others (in particular,
to their enemies). Such a ‘thought from the Outside ’, to quote Deleuze, is
used to unlock the challenging ending of the controversial documentary
The Act of Killing (2012) as a work of non-cinema which ultimately
negates its cinematic possibility in order to provide a more integral
engagement with reality. These two articles by Brown and Nagib, together
provide the pivotal centre of the Special Section. They illustrate how
(European and) non-European philosophies can be usefully used to
engage with a world of cinemas in ways that take us directly to the core of
cinematic thinking. In this respect, they also mark the shift in the Special
Section from its emphasis on the usefulness of ‘new’ (more accurately, as
yet under-utilised) philosophers from the world of philosophies for film-
philosophy, to an emphasis on the equally useful dimension of a world of
cinemas for uncovering the (historicized) political dimension that lies at
this core of filmic thought in a world of ‘de-Europeanized ’ (as Dabashi has
it) global capital. Here we find, to adapt Dabashi a little, not only what the
world of philosophies is thinking (which films can help us to unlock), but
just as importantly, what the world of cinemas is thinking (which
philosophies can help us to unlock).
Thus the collection concludes with two pieces that continue this
movement towards the political in relation to a world of cinemas. Patricia
Pisters transitions us from non-cinema to post-cinema, exploring how
contemporary filmmakers of different kinds work like media
archaeological metallurgists in their excavation of audio-visual archives
from which they produce works exploring the contingency of history
(inventing the past, relooping the past, and so on). Drawing on Deleuze
and Fe´lix Guattari’s geophilosophy, Pisters examines how the political
project once referred to as ‘Third Cinema’ now continues in new forms
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and formats, as modern political cinema looks to reshape collective
memory (and thereby construct new collectivities) as the globalized world
moves beyond postcoloniality. Finally, Kathleen Scott and Stefanie van de
Peer explore how the ideas of sympathy and seeing (as opposed to notions
of empathy and the gaze or look) can help to explain how female
solidarity is constructed between women in films undergoing extreme
conditions of suffering and viewers from (potentially) all around the
world. A key theoretical figure in their argument is the Caribbean
philosopher Frantz Fanon, who was not only influential in film theory’s
engagement with political cinema (the idea of ‘Third Cinema’ in
particular), but who also remains central in the current debate between
Dabashi/Mignolo and Zˇizˇek (et al.) over the distinction between European
and non-European philosophy. Here, in the authors’ developing of this
idea of transnational spectatorial solidarity with character, Fanon is joined
by Sandra Lee Bartky (amongst other feminist and postcolonial scholars,
such as E. Ann Kaplan, Sarah Cooper, Chandra Talpade Mohanty,
Lu´cia Nagib, Ella Shohat, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak), whose idea
of ‘ feeling-with ’ (similar to but also distinct from Jean-Luc Nancy’s
‘being-with ’) is combined with Fanon’s consideration of how sympathy
can arise from the violence surrounding colonial and postcolonial
struggles.
Together the authors explore films from Algeria, Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, the
Philippines, the UK and the USA, including co-productions with various
other countries, and films incorporating archival footage from other
countries still. The Special Section’s exploration of a world of cinemas
also includes within it clear evidence of the solidifying of the recent
‘ transnational turn’ (which has reanimated Film Studies after a long
adherence to the nation as structuring paradigm) in the conscious
decision by practically all the scholars involved to provide evidence in
diverse films from various parts of the world. This is a practice which Dina
Iordanova has called ‘watching across borders ’ (2010 p. 51).
In particular, the political dimension of the collection which comes
to the fore in many contributions, speaks to an emerging emphasis on
politics in film-philosophy, or perhaps more accurately (considering
the long history of discussion of political film in film theory), its
re-emergence. This is worth noting because a dominant and exciting area
of focus in film-philosophy in recent years has been ethics, as is evident in
the previous Film-Philosophy Special Section on Emmanuel Levinas, edited
by Sarah Cooper in 2007, along with various books by Cooper (2006),
Jane Stadler (2008), Catherine Wheatley (2009), Libby Saxton and
Lisa Downing (2010), Jin-hee Choi and Mattias Frei (2014), and
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Robert Sinnerbrink (2015) amongst others. What is most evident in the
pieces by Martin-Jones, Brown (in their use of Dussel’s historicized,
post-Levinasian ethics) and Scott and van de Peer (who position their
work on solidarity in distinction from a Levinasian approach to the
Other), is that the study of ethics in film-philosophy continues to develop,
incorporating now a foregrounded focus on its political dimension. The
selected articles demonstrate that this refocusing of the debate has been
prompted in large part by the engagement of a world of cinemas with the
conditions of alterity and inequality fostered by neoliberal globalization.
As such, the political side to ethics returns us once more to Dabashi and
Mignolo (et al.) and the question of how a world of philosophies, in this
instance engaging with a world of cinemas, can better enable our
understanding of the world we inhabit.
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